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Overview

T3N is a confidential-computing network. TEE contracts and data run inside hardware-secured TEE nodes. Data are stored in a shared key-value (KV) store, and that store is divided into namespaces so tenant data and T3N data stay isolated. A namespace is a prefix on a map name. T3N uses that prefix to route each KV operation through the right access policy. There are two main worlds of namespaces:
  • Tenant-owned namespaces (z:) — open-ended. Tenants create maps and TEE contracts at runtime (i.e., register new maps and contracts while the cluster is running; do not need to be built into the T3N node ahead of time), and access is governed dynamically by tenant identity, contract identity, and map policy.
  • T3N-owned namespaces (everything else) — fixed. These are system maps such as users, auth, dids, scripts, outbox_*, andidx:_tenant_*, with strict built-in rules.

Canonical format

As an external developer, your TEE contracts and data belongs in z-namespace. Every z-namespace resource uses this canonical name: z:<tid>:<tail> Example: z:8f3a0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdefc91d:secrets
Use the full canonical name when documenting, debugging, or reading audit output. High-level SDK helpers may ask only for the tenant-local tail.

Access model

T3N enforces tenant-map policy in the governed transaction path before writes commit. By default, a tenant contract can access only maps allowed by that map’s policy:
  • Writers controls which tenant contracts may write.
  • Readers controls which tenant contracts may read.
  • If readers is omitted on map creation, it defaults from writers.
  • Cross-tenant access is denied unless the map owner explicitly grants another tenant contract access.
This means cross-tenant access is possible by deliberate policy, but not by accident.
writers/readers gate your contracts, not you. They confine which contracts may touch a map at runtime — your own contracts included: a contract you deploy still needs to be on writers to write. They do not restrict the map’s owner: as the tenant that owns a map, you can always write or delete its entries directly through the authenticated control plane — e.g. tenant.executeControl("map-entry-set", …) — regardless of a writers: { only: [...] } grant, or add your contract to that grant via tenant.maps.update if you’d rather it write directly. (This is exactly how seeding an API key writes into a contract-only secrets map.) So a “contract-only” map is not tamper-proof against its own owner — the ACL is a boundary between your contracts and other tenants, not an integrity guarantee against you. For an audit trail even the owner can’t silently rewrite, use getActivityLog() instead — a host-stamped, append-only primitive built for exactly that.

Public tenant maps

A tenant-public map must use both:
Public maps are for data that is safe to expose. Never store PII, secrets, API keys, session data, or user-authentication material in a public map. Public visibility does not automatically let another tenant contract read through the authenticated contract path. Cross-tenant contract reads still require an explicit grant.

User PII

Tenant contracts cannot directly read the T3N users system map. Treat user profile data as outside z-space. If a product flow needs user profile fields, use the approved host capability path for that cluster. Do not copy PII into tenant maps just to make it easier for a contract to read.